DANDUM OF CONVERSATION

This decument was exempted from

declassification in a previous review, State 2/10/87

(8604537) Participants:

United States

Date: May 18, 1960 Time: 3:00 p.m.
Tree: American Embasey.

Livingston T. Merchant, Jules Leger, Canadian Permanent Under Secretary for Representative to NATO.

Subject: Summit Conference; Berlin Contingency Planning; Disarmament

Coules to:

Amer sy Moscow US Del Geneva BNA SOV RA GER Amembassy Ottewa USRO Paris

I saw Ambassador Leger for about half on low this afternoon at asked him what his thoughts were the shink and the had never the shink and the had never that a state of the conformed the leger to thought that a ceneral de Gaulle and even his country must be 150 thought that for the failure of the conforence by too heavy maistence on the condiscussibility of Berlin at the Su mit which in his view, may have lead thrushchev to the conclusion that there was nothing in it for him. In connection with HATO unity she thought that pressure on the weaker countries in the alliance would be steeped up by the Soviete and that the latter would continue to bound the 12 propagands theme. In reply to his questions I gave him a which summary of the conference. He thought that it had been handled very well by the West in face of Khrushchev's intemperance. We say the state of continuency planning. I said

Ambassador Leger asked the state of continuency planning. I told him that substantially it was in the same condition as at the time of the last report on it to the NATO Council but that the present state of our planning had been reviewed this morning by the three Foreign Ministers and a working group had been appointed to do a summary of conclusions for the Heads of Government later in the day.

He asked if the Fresient's statement that U-2 flights had been

said that the President had not qualified his statement that they

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would not be resumed during his term of office.

He sked about the future of the nuclear test and disarmment conferences. I said that the future and events would tell and that we would have to consider the matter. In light of deliberation on the meaning of the Summit Conference and what the Soviets might do in the coming days. Reamwhile, naturally our posture was that we assumed the talks would continue and would hope for constructive results.

We discussed inconclusively that the risks and chances were that Khrushchev might do something precipitate on Berlin.

USDLL:LTMerchant:sp May 18, 1960

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